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MELENDEZ-DIAZ v.
MASSACHUSETTS:
LABORATORY TESTING AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
DAVID MANSFIELD*

I. INTRODUCTION
Luis E. Melendez-Diaz was convicted of distributing and
trafficking cocaine.1 The evidence against him included nineteen
plastic bags of cocaine that he and his co-defendant dropped in a
2
squad car. The evidence also included sworn certificates from a
laboratory technician that affirmed the bags contained cocaine and
stated its weight and concentration.3 Melendez-Diaz did not have the
opportunity to cross-examine the technician responsible for writing
these certificates and argued that they therefore should not be
admitted into evidence.4
The Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the admission of the
certificates,5 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied review.6
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a
drug analysis certificate is testimonial evidence under Crawford v.
Washington,7 and thus, whether a defendant must have the
opportunity to cross-examine the person who issues one before such

* 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 2189152 at *1 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2007).
2. Id. at *2.
3. Id. at *4.
4. See id. at *4 & n.3 (upholding the admission of the certificates under Commonwealth v.
Verde, 827 N.E.2d. 701 (2005), which ruled that admitting such certificates without crossexamination does not violate the Confrontation Clause).
5. Id. at *4.
6. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007) (unpublished table
decision).
7. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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evidence is constitutionally admissible under the Confrontation
Clause.8 Because drug analysis certificates are prepared under oath
and for use at trial, the Court will likely conclude that such certificates
are testimonial evidence and that the Confrontation Clause requires
cross-examination.
II. FACTS
In the fall of 2001, the loss prevention manager of a K-Mart store
in Dorchester, Massachusetts, reported an employee’s suspicious
9
behavior to Boston Police Detective Robert Pieroway. The employee,
Thomas Wright made and received several phone calls,10 after which
he would usually leave the store and get into a blue four-door
Mercury Sable sedan driven by Ellis Montero, who occasionally was
accompanied by another passenger.11 The car would depart for
12
roughly ten minutes before returning to drop Wright off at the store.
In response to this report, Pieroway set up surveillance at the store13
and observed Wright exit, look around for a few minutes, and then go
14
back inside. Moments later, a blue Mercury Sable sedan drove by,
made a U-turn, and again picked up Wright as he emerged from the
building.15
After Wright entered the vehicle, the driver, Ellis Montero, drove
slowly through the store’s parking lot, at one point passing within ten
feet of Detective Pieroway.16 When Wright ultimately exited the car
and began walking back toward the store, Pieroway stopped him for
17
questioning. Wright admitted to Pieroway that he was carrying
cocaine; Pieroway then searched Wright’s person and found four bags
18
containing a total of 4.75 grams of cocaine in Wright’s possession.
Pieroway notified Boston Police Officers Ryan and Anderson who
stopped the Mercury Sable and arrested the driver, Montero, and the

8. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2007 WL 2189152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-591).
9. Id.
10. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 2007 WL 2189152 at *1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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passenger, Melendez-Diaz.19 The officers searched neither the suspects
nor the vehicle for contraband at this time because, according to
police regulations, drug unit officers would conduct the search later.20
The officers returned to the storefront to arrest Wright and
transported all three suspects to the station in their cruiser’s
backseat.21
During the brief trip to the station, Montero and Melendez-Diaz
spoke in Spanish, fidgeted, “ma[de] furtive movements,” and tried to
create space between them.22 While the suspects were being booked,
Anderson returned to the cruiser and found $320 by the door that
23
Montero and Melendez-Diaz had used to exit the vehicle. Anderson
also found nineteen plastic bags of cocaine, identical to the bags
24
Pieroway recovered from Wright.
The State charged Melendez-Diaz with distributing and trafficking
25
cocaine. The packets of cocaine found on Wright and those found in
26
the cruiser were admitted into evidence against Melendez-Diaz, as
were drug analysis certificates for the tests that technicians had
performed on the packets.27 A jury convicted Melendez-Diaz of both
28
counts.
On appeal, Melendez-Diaz challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence against him, the admission of the drug certificates, and the
29
effectiveness of his trial counsel. The Massachusetts Appeals Court
rejected all three arguments30 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court
denied review.31 Melendez-Diaz appealed to the Supreme Court,
32
which granted certiorari.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *1.
26. Id. at *1–2.
27. Id. at *4.
28. Id. at *1.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *5.
31. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007) (unpublished table
decision).
32. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2007 WL 2189152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-591).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Massachusetts has long admitted drug certificates without
requiring the court to allow the defendant to cross-examine the
33
responsible technician. Prior to 2004, such certificates were
constitutionally admissible without confrontation so long as the
technician was unavailable and the certificates were sufficiently
reliable.34 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v.
Washington in 2004, however, defendants must be given the
opportunity to cross-examine the maker of any testimonial statement
used against them, either at trial or at some earlier time.35 The
question in this case is whether drug analysis certificates are
testimonial evidence.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
36
confronted with the witnesses against him.” This guarantee applies to
the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.37 The Supreme Court has rejected a literal reading of
the provision, which would exclude from evidence any statement
made by an individual not examined at trial, as unintended and
extreme.38 Instead, the Court has permitted some limited departures
from a strict reading in order to balance defendants’ procedural rights
39
against state interests in effective law enforcement.
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court articulated a two-part test to
determine when hearsay evidence may be admitted without violating
40
the Confrontation Clause. First, the prosecution must demonstrate
the unavailability of the witness whose statement it seeks to use.41
Second, the hearsay in question must bear adequate indicia of
reliability, so as to afford some basis to evaluate the credibility of the

33. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d. 701, 704 (2005) (citing Commonwealth v.
Slavski, 140 N.E. 465 (1923) and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d. 346 (1969)).
34. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 54 (2004).
35. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (applying the Sixth
Amendment to the states).
38. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
39. Id. at 64; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (detailing the policy behind
hearsay rules).
40. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
41. Id.
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evidence in the absence of cross-examination.42 This test remained in
effect until 2004.43
44
In Crawford, the Court rejected the Roberts standard. Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, examined the history of the right to
45
confrontation and concluded that the Framers intended the
Confrontation Clause to bar the use of ex parte examinations as
46
evidence against the accused. As a result, some unreliable hearsay
(such as offhand, overheard remarks) is non-testimonial, admissible
evidence that does not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause, while
some reliable hearsay (particularly ex parte examinations) is
constitutionally inadmissible because it is testimonial.47 In essence, the
Confrontation Clause permits the defendant the right to
confrontation when the prosecution seeks to introduce “testimonial”
statements48 Yet, the Crawford Court did not adopt a universal
standard for lowers courts to use to determine whether evidence is
49
testimonial.
Under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause prohibits admission of
testimonial statements unless the declarant is unavailable to testify
and the defense had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
50
declarant. Exceptions are allowed if they existed at the time of the
Framing, but these exceptions apply primarily to statements that are
51
not testimonial in nature, such as business records. With the
52
exception of dying declarations, the Framers did not envision that
prior testimony53 or other testimonial evidence could be admitted
without the defendant having the opportunity to cross-examine the
54
declarant. Accordingly, the Court held that, even when testimonial
hearsay is reliable, the Constitution requires the right to confrontation
because “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is
42. Id. at 66.
43. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 68–69 (2004) (citing the Roberts standard as
the then-current test before overruling it).
44. Id. at 68–69.
45. Id. at 44.
46. Id. at 50–51.
47. Id. at 51.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 52 (declining to adopt any of various formulations).
50. Id. at 54.
51. Id. at 56.
52. Id. at 56 n.6 (recognizing that dying declarations were an exception at the time of the
Framing and therefore are admissible without cross-examination).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 56 n.7.
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obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment
prescribes.”55
The Court has yet to articulate a clear standard for whether
evidence is testimonial.56 In Davis v. Washington, the Court continued
to avoid establishing a universal standard, holding only that
statements are not testimonial when made with the primary purpose
of enabling police to meet an ongoing emergency.57 On the other
hand, statements are testimonial if made to the police absent an
emergency or made in order to prove past events for later criminal
prosecution.58
The first class of statements—in Davis, answers given during a 911
call—are not testimonial because they are not offered in a formal
context and are not meant primarily to prove a past fact.59 Such
statements are not analogous to trial testimony; witnesses do not take
60
the stand at trial to seek assistance with an ongoing emergency. In
contrast, statements from the latter class—in Davis, answers given to
police during the stable aftermath of a domestic dispute—are
testimonial because they are made primarily to assist police in
investigating a possible crime.61 Such statements are therefore
analogous to live testimony at trial, because they serve to establish
62
past facts.
The issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts is whether drug
analysis certificates are testimonial under the Crawford and Davis
63
standards.
IV. HOLDING BELOW
Petitioner Melendez-Diaz appealed his conviction on three
grounds: sufficiency of the evidence, improper admission of the drug
certificates, and ineffective assistance of counsel.64 The Court granted
55. Id. at 61–62.
56. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 826–27.
60. Id. at 828.
61. Id. at 830.
62. Id. at 830–31.
63. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2007 WL 2189152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-591).
64. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 2189152 at *1 (Mass. App.
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certiorari on only the second issue—whether admission of the drug
certificates violated Melendez-Diaz’s Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses against him.65
The Massachusetts Appeals Court relied on Commonwealth v.
Verde66 to flatly reject Melendez-Diaz’s argument that admitting the
drug certificates at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to
67
confront witnesses against him. In Verde the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that drug certificates were non-testimonial business
records that do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.68
In prior cases, the Massachusetts Supreme Court had held that the
admission of liquor or drug as evidence does not violate the
defendant’s right to confrontation.69 The defendant in Verde argued
70
that Crawford v. Washington had overturned these cases and
required the court to permit the defendant to cross-examine the
certificates’ technician even if the court deemed the evidence
reliable.71 The Massachusetts Supreme Court disagreed because the
Supreme Court in Crawford had indicated in dicta that business and
official records fell under an established hearsay exception not
subject to the Confrontation Clause.72
The court said that public records were an acknowledged
exception to the Confrontation Clause, dating to at least to the
73
adoption of the Massachusetts Constitution. This exception
established that, when a public officer in the performance of his or
her official duty makes a record of a primary fact, that record may
serve as prima facie evidence of that fact.74 In contrast, records
“involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of
opinion, and making conclusions are not admissible in evidence as
public records.”75

Ct. 2007).
65. Id.
66. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (2005).
67. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 2007 WL 2189152 at *4.
68. Id.
69. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 704 (citing Commonwealth v. Slavski, 140 N.E. 465 (1923) and
Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346 (1969)).
70. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
71. Verde, 827 N.E.2d. at 704.
72. Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56).
73. Id. at 705 (citing Slavski, 140 N.E. at 465; Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366
(Mass. 1988)).
74. Id. (quoting Slavski, 140 N.E. at 465).
75. Id.

DO NOT DELETE

12/30/2008 8:48:32 AM

168 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:161

Drug analysis certificates, like those admitted against MelendezDiaz, are not discretionary or based on opinion because they merely
state the results of an established scientific test as to the quantity and
76
composition of a substance. The court noted that several other
jurisdictions had reached the same conclusion in admitting such
evidence,77 though it also recognized disagreement in this area.78
Refusing to analogize drug certificates to ex parte examinations, the
court wrote that drug certificates do not implicate “the principal evil
at which the Confrontation Clause was directed,” specifically ex parte
79
examinations by investigating magistrates.
The court also found it significant that a defendant can rebut the
figures stated in the certificate, and that the defendant in Verde had
80
tried and failed to do so. Furthermore, the issue about which Verde’s
expert had wished to question the State’s chemist—the purity of a
cocaine sample—was not a required element of the State’s case.81
Regardless, “the jury w[as] free to credit [the expert’s] testimony and
82
to discredit the certificate of analysis as [it] saw fit.”
Because the drug certificates contained records of fact only, and
because the defendant could rebut those records, the court held that
83
such certificates are non-testimonial business records. Therefore, the
defendant’s inability to cross-examine the State chemist did not
84
violate his confrontation right.

76. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Mass. 1969);
Commonwealth v. Westerman, 611 N.E.2d 215, 223–24 (Mass. 1993)).
77. Id. at 705 n.4 (citing Perkins v. State, 897 So. 2d 457, 462–65 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)
(permitting admission of an autopsy report as a business record); Smith v. State, 898 So. 2d 907,
910–11 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (rejecting admission of a particular autopsy report because it
contained opinion but allowing admission of autopsy reports generally as non-testimonial
business records); People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 231–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that a laboratory report is routine documentary evidence); State v. Thackaberry, 95 P.3d 1142,
1145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a laboratory report of urinalysis is “analogous to—or
arguably even the same as—a business or official record”)).
78. Id. (citing Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 595 (Nev. 2004), modified by Las Vegas v.
Walsh, 100 P.3d 658 (Nev. 2004) (rejecting admission of a statutorily required affidavit made by
a nurse in order to show the presence of alcohol in blood because the affidavit had been
prepared specifically for use by the prosecution at trial); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393,
393 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that a blood test report prepared in anticipation of litigation
was not admissible as a business record)).
79. Id. at 705 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,50 (2004)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 706 n.5.
82. Id. at 706.
83. Id. at 705–06.
84. Id. at 706.
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V. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeal’s holding that drug certificates can be
admitted without cross-examination rests on three justifications. First,
85
drug certificates contain only facts, not opinion or discretion. Second,
they are business records, which are non-testimonial under Crawford
86
v. Washington. Third, the defendant can rebut these certificates and
the jury is free to discredit them.87 All three arguments, however, are
untenable under Crawford.
The first justification—that the certificates reflect only facts, not
opinions—sounds suspiciously like the “indicia of reliability” test used
in Ohio v. Roberts.88 The Court forcefully renounced this standard in
Crawford, declaring that the Confrontation Clause does not demand
reliability but rather a particular means of discerning reliability: crossexamination.89 In Davis v. Washington, the Court did not ask whether
the statements in question were reliable, but whether the declarant’s
90
primary purpose was to establish a past fact at trial. These
certificates are no less able to prove a past fact at trial just because
they contain only facts, so this factor has no bearing on whether or not
drug analysis certificates are testimonial.91
The second justification—that these certificates are business
92
records and thus are not testimonial—is also at odds with Crawford.
The Court in Crawford did note that business records fall within a
hearsay exception recognized by the Framers and that such records
are normally non-testimonial.93 The Court also specifically noted,
however, that testimonial evidence demands confrontation, even
when it falls within a hearsay exception, implying that some business
records may be testimonial.94 Thus, even if drug certificates are
business records within the hearsay exception, they still might be
testimonial statements and thus require an opportunity for the
95
defendant to cross-examine the declarant. The certificates here were

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 705.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 705–706.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,61–62 (2004).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826–27, 830–31 (2006).
See id. (stating the importance of whether evidence would establish a past fact at trial).
Verde, 827 N.E.2d. at 705.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
Id. at 56 n.7.
See id. (implying that business records may be testimonial in some cases).

DO NOT DELETE

12/30/2008 8:48:32 AM

170 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:161

signed under oath and include the name of the criminal defendant,
indicating that they were solemn pronouncements made for the
purpose of establishing facts at trial.96 Because Davis strongly suggests
97
that such statements are testimonial, the business records exception
does not obviate the constitutional right to cross-examination.98
Finally, the court’s concluding justification—that these certificates
are not testimonial because the defendant can rebut them and
because the jury may discredit them—conflicts directly with
99
Crawford. First, a key purpose of cross-examination is the
defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine the declarant before the
jury in order to give the jury grounds to believe or disbelieve the
declarant. Therefore, the mere chance for rebuttal is not an adequate
100
substitute for such a key purpose of cross-examination. Second, the
Court in Crawford noted that the opportunity to rebut statements
does not satisfy the common law doctrine of confrontation, and so the
Appeals Court was plainly wrong to accept an opportunity for
rebuttal as an adequate substitute for cross-examination.101
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Melendez-Diaz argues
primarily that prosecutors offer drug analysis certificates in lieu of
testimony—in order to prove a fact at trial—and are thus testimonial
under the standard discussed in Davis v. Washington and require that
the defendant have an opportunity to confront the certificates’
technician.102 Melendez-Diaz’s arguments in response to the lower
court’s rationale were substantially laid out above. First, though the
certificates are documents of fact, their purported reliability is no
longer a constitutional ground on which to admit them.103 Second,
Melendez-Diaz argues, the certificates are not business records, and
even if they were, the Court in Crawford stated that testimonial

96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. at 24a–29a, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2007
WL 2189152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (No. 07-591).
97. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826–27, 830–31 (2006).
98. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7.
99. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 706 (2005).
100. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (2004) (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242–43 (1895) (overruled on other grounds)).
101. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (noting that the opportunity to challenge those who read
accusatory letters in court was not enough).
102. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at 20.
103. Id. at 23.
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evidence is not insulated by hearsay exceptions.104
The State offers an additional rationale. It argues that drug
certificates are a contemporaneous recording of observable events,
105
akin to the 9-1-1 call in Davis, rather than a narrative of past fact.
Melendez-Diaz responds that these certificates do not implicate the
emergency setting present in Davis.106 He further argues that the test
in Davis is not whether statements are contemporaneous but whether
the prosecution offers them primarily for the purpose of establishing
a fact at trial.107
The State’s arguments that drug certificates are non-testimonial,
largely ignore the Court’s concern in Davis regarding whether
particular statements are offered to prove a fact at trial.108 Because the
certificates are prepared specifically for use at trial—they even
feature a defendant’s name109—they are probably testimonial under
Davis.110 Thus, Melendez-Diaz likely has a stronger argument than the
State based solely on Crawford and Davis.
The State argues that regardless of whether the certificates are
testimonial, the effect that requiring cross-examination for drug
certificates would have on the justice system should insulate them
111
from Confrontation Clause challenges. In Massachusetts alone,
laboratories analyze between 38,000 and 40,000 drug samples each
112
year. Requiring scientists to testify about each of their examinations
“would greatly reduce the amount of time those scientists have to
actually conduct the examinations and analyses”113 and would be of
little use because scientists often would rely on the certificate to jog
114
their memory of a specific test.” Thirty-five states and the District of
Columbia agree that, if the Court ruled for Melendez-Diaz, systematic

104. Id. at 23–24.
105. Brief for the Respondent at 27, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591 (U.S. Feb.
5, 2008).
106. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at 25.
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text.
109. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at App. 24a–29a.
110. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 826–27, 830–31 (2006).
111. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 105, at 34.
112. Id. at 35 (citing Brief for the Attorney General and Department of Public Health as
Amici Curiae Supporting the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Verde, No. SJC-09320, 2004
WL 3421947, at *5 (2004)).
113. Id. (citing Pruitt v. State, 954 So. 2d 611, 615 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)).
114. Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)).
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gridlock would result.115
Melendez-Diaz responds, however, that several states require
forensic examiners to testify if the defendant so requests, and that in
116
these states the criminal justice system has not collapsed. To explain
this phenomenon, Melendez-Diaz points to language authored by the
State:
[I]t is almost always the case that [forensic laboratory reports] are
admitted without objection. Generally, defendants do not object to
the admission of drug certificates most likely because there is no
benefit to the defendant from such testimony. The testimony of the
analyst will only serve to resolve any possibility of reasonable
doubt, not only in the identification of the substance as contraband
117
but also as to the weight of the substance for trafficking offenses.

Several law professors who support Melendez-Diaz assert that the
burdens will be slight because stipulations,118 notice-and-demand
119
120
121
statutes, clever courtroom scheduling, video testimony, and (in
some narrow circumstances) surrogate testimony will all reduce the
impact of requiring cross-examination for forensic reports,122 but that,
in those rare cases when forensic evidence is manipulated or
123
defective, cross-examination is critical to check the prosecution.
The State’s concerns are considerable, especially because of the
Supreme Court’s practice of balancing the accused’s interests with law

115. Brief for the State of Alabama, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591 (U.S. Sep. 9, 2008)).
116. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 10–11, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591
(U.S. Feb. 19, 2008).
117. Id. at 11 (citing Brief for the Commonwealth as Amicus Curiae at 7, Commonwealth v.
Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005), available at 2004 WL 3421945).
118. Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591 (U.S. Jun. 23, 2008).
119. Id. at 13 (describing a mechanism by which prosecutors would service defendants’
notice of intent to offer forensic testimony without cross-examination and in which defendants
would have the right to demand cross-examination).
120. Id. at 16 (describing the use of courtroom scheduling to mitigate the need for repeated
travel for individual analysts).
121. Id. at 17 (describing how such testimony would allow the jury to view body language
and demeanor while reducing the expense of bringing the analyst to court).
122. Id. at 23 (arguing that, when “(1) conducting another test is infeasible; (2) the original
test was conducted in accordance with regularized procedures and documented in sufficient
detail for another expert to understand, interpret, and evaluate the results, and (3) the original
expert is now unavailable,” the Confrontation Clause permits testimony by another qualified
expert about the analysis).
123. Id. (citing Brief for Professor Pamela R. Metzger et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 12–20 & App., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2007)).
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enforcement’s interests in the Confrontation Clause area.124
Melendez-Diaz and the law professor amici convincingly argue,
however, that the State exaggerates the dangers of permitting cross125
examination here. The State’s policy arguments are unlikely to
prevail given the strength of petitioner’s argument that drug analysis
certificates are testimonial evidence under Crawford and Davis, which
provide Melendez-Diaz with a constitutional right to cross-examine
the issuer.126
The real questions in this case do not involve who will prevail—
Melendez-Diaz will, in all likelihood, if the above analysis is correct—
but instead involve (1) whether the Court will articulate a more
complete standard for what statements are testimonial and (2)
whether the Court will again rule unanimously or 8-1, as it has done in
Crawford and Davis. These two questions are in tension and a more
detailed articulation may spark dissent. I offer tentative hypotheses
on each question.
First, because Davis, without any significant elaboration, supports
Melendez-Diaz’s case, the Court can follow the language of that
127
decision with little additional reasoning. The Court has been
reluctant to articulate a full standard thus far, and it is likely that they
will not do so here.128
Second, the Court will likely remain unanimous, or nearly so,
particularly if the Justices refuse to adopt a more exact test. Among
the sitting Justices, only Justice Thomas has expressed reservations
about the Crawford line of cases. Justice Thomas dissented in part in
Davis, arguing that whether evidence is testimonial should be
determined by its formality.129 He also wrote that the Confrontation
Clause should apply when the prosecution seeks to avoid cross130
examination. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts implicates both issues,
because the certificates are sworn statements,131 which for policy
132
reasons the State introduced to avoid cross-examination. As such,

124. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
125. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 116, at 10–11; Brief for Law Professors as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 118, at 10, 13, 16–17, 23.
126. See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
129. Crawford v. Washington, 547 U.S. at 834, 840 (2004).
130. Id. at 840.
131. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, App. at 24a–29a.
132. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 105, at 34.
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Justice Thomas will likely also side with the Melendez-Diaz here,
though it would be unsurprising if he dissented again.
The likely result then, is a narrow, unanimous (or 8-1) ruling for
the petitioner that drug analysis certificates are testimonial evidence
that are subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.

